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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature 
is !a a case. la earl 
magistrate's decision to the district court. This appeal is taken on District 
Court Judge D. Duff McKee's order, entered and filed February 10, 2015, 
dismissing the appeal from magistrate's division on the ground it was not 
timely filed. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
Gordon Thomas Lanham died on December 5, 2013. Decedent had 
executed a Last Will and Testament on January 19, 2011. (R.p.10). Decedent 
intended to disinherit Appellant and his brother. He specifically gifted them 
each $1.00 and a bed made for them by their grandfather. (R.p. 10-11). 
A Petition for Informal Probate was filed on December 20, 2013. 
(R.p.6) On January 8, 2014, Appellant, Thomas Everett Lanham, a son, filed 
pro se an "Application to Attest Personal Representative." (R.p.2, Registry of 
Actions, hereinafter ROA, Motion to Augment filed September 25, 20151, 
Application to Attest Personal Representative, filed January 8, 2014). On 
January 13, 2014, Keith Lanham, by and through his attorney William F. Lee, 
filed a Petition to Remove Personal Representative with claims contesting 
validity of the will and seeking removal of the personal representative. 
(R.pp.19-20). Both matters, Appellant's prose application and Keith Lanham's 
1 Hereafter referred to as Motion to Augment. 
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petition, were set for hearing on January 21, 2014. 
On January 21, 2014, Appellant, appeared; pro se. Keith Lanham 
appeared with his attorney, William F. Lee. The personal representative was 
also present with his attorney. The Court continued both matters for a half 
day court trial on April 2, 2014. Judge Smith signed an ORDER SETTING 
HEARING TO A DATE CERTAIN providing notice of the April 2, 2014 trial. This 
order was delivered, to Appellant, to William F. Lee, attorney and to Nancy 
Callahan. (Motion to Augment, Order Setting Hearing to a Date Certain, file 
stamped January 21, 2014 and Clerk's Minutes, dated January 21, 2014).2 
Appellant retained Attorney Fleenor on February 10, 2014. (R.p.42). 
Attorney Fleenor entered an appearance in this case on behalf of Appellant by 
filing a Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will 
and Determining Heirs (R.pp. 23-25) and a Petition of Order Restraining 
Personal Representative on March 24, 2014. (ROA p. 3) These Petitions were 
noticed for hearing by Mr. Fleenor for April 3, 2014. 3 
On March 28, 2014, the personal representative filed an affidavit with an 
attached audio recording of the decedent. On March 31, 2014, William F. Lee, 
on behalf of Keith Lanham, withdrew his Petition to Remove Personal 
Representative and Keith's contest of the validity of the will. (ROA, R.p. 3). 
On April 2, 2014, the personal representative appeared with witnesses 
2 Appellant incorrectly states in his Statement of the Case that Mr. Lee was tasked with providing notice, notice of 
hearing was not filed with the court, and "Thomas Lanham never received notice of the hearing." (Appellant's Brief 
p. 1) 
3 The Notice of Hearing and certificate of service provides only a 10 day notice. 
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prepared for trial. Appeilant and his attorney failed to appear. 
On April 3, 2014, Appellant appeared wlth Mr. Fleenor for hearing on his 
Petition for Order Removing Personal Representative, Construing Will and 
Determining Heirs and his Petition for Order Restraining Persona! 
Representative. The personal representative and witnesses again appeared 
prepared for trial. Appellant did not have evidence to present, just argument. 
The Court reviewed the record and arguments of counsel and denied 
Appellant's petitions. The Court instructed Attorney Fleenor that if Appellant 
wanted to challenge the will he could file a petition and set it for a pretrial date 
with the clerk. (Motion to Augment, Clerk's Minutes, dated April 3, 2014). 
On April 8, 2014 Respondent filed a Motion, Affidavit, and Memorandum 
for attorney's fees. (R.p. 26). On April 11, 2014, Appellant filed his objection. 
(R.p. 41). The matter of fees was not noticed for hearing at that time. 
As noted above, after the April 2 and 3rd 2014 hearings, there was no 
other petition pending before the magistrate. The petitions Appellant filed 
were denied April 3, 2014. . Contrary to the Magistrate's instructions to 
Appellant and his attorney on April 3, 2015 to file a petition to contest the 
will and set the matter for a pretrial hearing, Appellant instead filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment as a "Petitioner." (R.p. 49) Appellant's 
memorandum claimed that "Petitioner" was seeking summary judgment 
because the will was invalid as a matter of law. (R.pp.47-48). 
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The Respondent filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with supporting affidavits. 
(R.p.53-77). Appeli2nt did not file any objections, a repiy or in any way 
respond to either of the Respondenfs motions. 
On June 10, 2014 a hearing was held. The Court announced from 
the bench that he would grant Respondent's motions and he denied 
Appellant's motion. On June 20, 2014 Attorney Fleenor filed a document 
purported to be a Motion for Reconsideration. (ROA p. 4). Appellant did 
not file a notice of hearing with his Motion for Reconsideration or in any 
other way indicate he wanted a hearing or oral argument in the motion. 
The Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the Judgment on June 25, 2014. (R.pp.79-84). After entry of the 
judgment Appellant did not request oral argument or file a notice of 
hearing on his Motion for Reconsideration within 14 days after the entry 
of the judgment or at any time. 
On July 9, 2014, Respondent filed a Motion Affidavit and Memorandum 
for attorney's fees and Appellant filed his objection on July 31, 2014.4 (R.pp. 
87, 105, 114) The matter was not noticed for hearing by either party at that 
time. 
4 Appellant's objection to attorney's fees was filed 8 days late. 
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On August 13, 2014, 49 days after the entry of the judgment on 
June 25, 2014, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from the Magistrate's 
Division to the District Cour~. (R.pp. 112-13). 
Appellant changed attorneys on November 13, 2014. (ROA, R.p. 4) 
Appellant's new attorneys commenced briefing on Appellant's appeal and 
submitted Appellant's brief on November 26, 2015. 5 (R.p. 118-33). 
Appellant's brief did not mention the Motion for Reconsideration as an 
issue and it did not address the timeliness of the appeal. 
During the course of research and responding to Appellant's brief, 
Respondent's counsel discovered that the Notice of Appeal was not filed 
within 42 days of the judgment. A Motion to Dismiss Appeal was filed on 
January 14, 2015. (R.pp. 134-40). Appellant filed his Response to 
Motion to Dismiss Appeal. (R.pp. 142-46). Respondent filed a 
Respondent's Reply to Appellant's response. (R.pp. 147-56). The District 
Court entered its Order Dismissing Appellant's Appeal on February 10, 
2015. (R.p. 157-60). 
The Magistrate Court entered a Memorandum Decision on 
Attorneys fee on February 19, 2014 awarding Respondent attorney's fees 
in the earlier proceedings. Appellant appealed this decision and that 
appeal is pending before the District Court. 
5 Appellant's appeal brief filed in the district court is included in the Clerk's Record. (R.pp.118-33). 
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On March 23, 2015, Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal from 
the District Court's Order Dismissing Appeal to this Court. (R.p.185-87) 
RESPONDENT'S RESTATEMENT Of THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal when 
judgment was entered on June 25, 2014 and the Notice of Appeal 
was filed 49 days later on August 13, 2014. 
A. Whether due to a defect in the form of the judgment, 
the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment. 
B. Whether Appellant's time for filing his notice of appeal 
was tolled because Appellant filed a motion for 
reconsideration. 
2. Whether Respondent is entitled to Attorneys Fees on this 
appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54, Idaho Code §12-121, §12-123, 
I.R.C.P 11, I.A.R. 11.2 and IDAHO CODE §15-8-208. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
This Court directly reviews the decision of the district court acting 
in its appellate capacity. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 303 P.3d 214 
(2013). This Court will either affirm or reverse the district's court 
decision. Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 284 P.3d 970 (2012). The 
district court held the appeal from magistrate division was not timely 
filed and dismissed that appeal. The Court freely reviews questions of 
law. Whether an appeal to district court was timely filed is a question of 
law. Goodman Oil v Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 147 Idaho 56 
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(2009). The interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a 
uestion of law, and the Court exercises free review over their 
interpretation. Athay v Rich County, 153 Idaho 815,823 (2012). Where 
the ordinary meaning of a rule is susceptible to multiple interpretations, 
extrinsic evidence and the rules of statutory construction are used to 
determine the correct interpretation. Boswell v Steele, _ Idaho _, --
348 P.3d 497 (2015) Interpretations that lead to absurd results are 
disfavored. Id. at 506. 
Appellant advances two main contentions concerning the timeliness 
of his appeal from magistrate division to district court: (A) Because of 
defects in form, the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment; (B) 
The time for filing Appellant's notice of appeal was tolled because he filed 
a motion for reconsideration on June 20, 2014. 
A. Supposed defects in form of the judgment. 
Appellant argues that the judgment filed June 25, 2014 is not a final 
judgment. pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(a) because of defects and noncompliance 
with I.R.C.P. 54(a). (App.Br. p.3). Appellant seems to argue that the June 
25, 2014 judgment is an interlocutory judgment, not a final judgment. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 3). 
Appellant argues the June 25 judgment is not final because it does not 
comply with Rule 54(a). Appellant complains the judgment omits the phrase 
"JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS" and contains a recital of the 
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pleadings. Appellant cites LR.C.P. 54(a) and Cook v Arias, 2015 Lexis at 4-
5 (Idaho 2015). 
Appellant failed to raise this argument concerning the form of the 
judgment in magistrate court or in district court. In district court the 
Appellant failed to raise this argument in Appellant's brief or in its response 
to Respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Appellant should 
not be allowed to raise the issue for the first time before this Court. This 
Court will not address issues not preserved for appeal. See, State v Fodge, 
121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126 (generally, issues not raised below may 
not be considered for the first time on appeal); State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 
267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 (2003)(where a party appeals the decision of an 
intermediate appellate court, the appellant may not raise issues that are 
different from those presented to the intermediate court). 
Considered on the merits the Appellant's argument about the form of 
judgment fails. The language of I.C.R.P. 54(a) requiring judgments to begin 
with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: ... " was added by an 
amendment effective July 1, 2014. That requirement of Rule 54(a) was not 
in effect when Magistrate Judge Tyler Smith entered the judgment in this 
case June 25, 2014. Failure to include that language is a not a defect. 
The judgment does include some procedural history, in arguable 
violation of Rule 54(a). Respondent submits that the terse recitation of prior 
proceedings in the judgment does not mean it is not a valid final judgment. 
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Whether the small 1 truncated procedural history contained in the 
judgment invalidates the judgment, need not be decided. The Idaho 
Supreme Court, on February 12, 2015, through Chief Justice Roger S. 
Burdick, entered Supreme Court Order, "In Re: Finality of Judgments 
Entered Prior to April 151 2015." The Court ordered that "any judgment, 
decree or order entered before April 15, 2015, that was intended to be final 
but which did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) or Idaho 
Rule of Family Procedure 803 shall be treated as a final judgment." 
The Magistrate's judgment entered on June 25, 2014 was intended to 
be a final judgment. The judgment disposed of all claims of the parties. The 
magistrate intended the judgment to be final. The parties all understood the 
judgment to be an appealable final judgment. Nothing in the record 
suggests the parties or the Magistrate anticipated any further proceedings in 
magistrate court, other than settling costs and attorney fees. Appellant does 
not seem to acknowledge that if his complaint about the form of the 
judgment is correct, and no final judgment was entered, then his appeal 
proceedings in district court and in this court have all been for naught. 
By the totality of the text of I.R.C.P. 54(a) and the authority of the 
Supreme Court Order of February 12, 2015, quoted on the previous page, 
the judgment is a valid final judgment. 
B. Appellant failed to provide notice of hearing at the time he 
filed his motion for reconsideration or at any time after entry of 
judgment. 
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Appellant argues because he filed a motion for reconsideration the 
time for filing appeal is tolled indefinitely (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). Appellant 
claims that his Notice of Appeal from magistrate's division, fl!ed 49 days 
after judgment was filed, was timeiy even though the motion for 
reconsideration was filed after hearing and before entry of judgment. 
(Appeliant's brief 4-8). 
Appellant goes to great lengths to argue that his Motion for 
Reconsideration was timely filed and tolled the time for filing his appeal. 
What Appellant fails to address is that even if his motion for reconsideration 
was timely it was never brought before the court for hearing. I.R.C.P. 7(b). 7 
This rule requires that a notice of hearing accompany the motion or the 
motion be contained within a notice of hearing, unless the motion is made ex 
parte. It is the litigant's duty to secure a hearing on a motion if one is 
desired. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l) dictates that a proper motion (other than one 
7 Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(b)(l). Motions and Other Papers. 
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be 
made in writing, shall state with particularity the grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil rule, 
if any, under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. A proposed form of order, if included, 
shall be a separate document. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of 
the hearing of the motion. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 7(b)(3). Time Limits for Filing and Serving Motions, Affidavits and Briefs. 
Unless otherwise ordered by the court, which order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application, or 
specified elsewhere in these rules: 
(A) A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall be 
filed with the court, and served so that it is received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) days before the time 
specified for the hearing. 
*** 
(D) If the moving party does not request oral argument upon the motion, and does not file a brief within fourteen 
(14) days, the court may deny such motion without notice if the court deems the motion has no merit. If argument 
has been requested on any motion, the court may, in its discretion, deny oral argument by counsel by written or 
oral notice to all counsel before the day of the hearing, and the court may limit oral argument at any time. 
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made exparte or at trial) shall be in writing, state with particularly the 
grounds for the motion and includes the number of any applicable civil rule 
under which it is filed. The requirement of a written motion can be fulfllied if 
the motion is stated in a notice of hearing. 
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) requires that "[a] written motion, other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereon shall 
be filed with the court, and served so that it is received by the parties no 
later than fourteen (14) days before the time specified for the hearing." 
(Emphasis added) 
Appellant's purported Motion for Reconsideration at the heart of their 
argument was never properly filed or brought before the magistrate because 
the form of the motion a) was not within a notice of hearing; b) Appellant 
did not file a notice of hearing at the time he filed the purported Motion for 
Reconsideration; and c) Appellant did not file a notice of hearing at any time 
after the entry of the magistrate's findings of facts and conclusions of law 
and judgment. 
C. Appellant's motion for reconsideration was not a valid post 
judgment motion and did not suspend the time for filing his notice of 
appeal indefinitely. 
Appellant argues that an appeal must be filed within 42 days of a 
judgment and that "the running of the time for appeal from a final judgment 
is suspended by ... a timely motion to amend or make additional findings of 
11 
fact or conclusions of law, whether or not an alteration of the judgment is 
required if the motion is granted." (App.Br.p.3-6) 
In this case, there was no post-judgment motion even if it ls 
considered a premature post trial judgment. Appellant attempts to get 
around this by arguing that Appellant's motion for reconsideration was really 
a post-judgment motion to amend the finding of fact and conclusion of law 
before the findings of fact and conclusions of law existed. 
Appeals from the Magistrate's Division to the District Court are 
governed by I.R.C.P. 83(e) I.R.C.P. 83(e)(l)-(4) prescribes the types of 
motions that suspend or toll the time for filing an appeal. 
Rule 83{e}. Filing appeal. 
Except for the filing of an appeal from a small claim 
judgment as provided in Rule 81(1), an appeal to a district court 
from the magistrate's divisions must be filed with the 
appropriate district court within 42 days after entry of the 
judgment or order. Provided, however, that in the magistrate's 
division the running of the time for appeal from a final judgment 
is suspended by (1) a timely motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict following a timely motion for a 
directed verdict, (2) a timely motion to amend or make 
additional findings of fact or conclusions of law, whether or not 
alteration of the judgment is required if the motion is granted, 
(3) a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment (except 
motions under Rule 60 or motions regarding costs and attorney 
fees) or ( 4) a timely motion for new trial; and the full time for 
appeal from such a final judgment commences to run and is to 
be computed from the date of the clerk's filing stamp on any 
order granting or denying any of the above motions. 
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A timely filing of the motions described in (1) through (4) of I.R.C.P. 
83(e), not only suspends running of time for appeal, it restarts the 42 d:-.: y 
period running when the motion is granted or denied. 
Of the four types of motions which suspend running of the time for 
appeal, Rule 83(e)(1) through (4), Appellant relies only on the second type, 
"a timely motion to amend or make additional findings of fact or conclusions 
of law, whether or not alteration of the judgment is required if the motion is 
granted." (App.Br.p.3-6) Appellant argues his motion for reconsideration is 
really a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact to fit the tolling 
provisions of Rule 83(e)(2). By relying on only 83(e)(2), Appellant waived 
argument, or conceded the inapplicability of Rule 83(e)(l), (3), and (4). 9 
Appellant seems to blame the magistrate for the absurd result that is 
the inevitable conclusion of Appellant's analysis. Appellant attempts to 
support his argument that the motion for reconsideration tolled indefinitely 
the time for filing an appeal with State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659 (Ct. App. 
2002); Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1994), and State V. 
Wolfe,_ Idaho_, 343 P.3d 497, (Idaho 2015). Respondent is unable to 
see how Ade, Ferguson or Wolfe helps Appellant. Not one of these cases 
9 Respondent agrees that I.R.C.P. 83(e)(1),{3),and (4) cannot possibly be applied to Appellant's motion for 
reconsideration. The first type, (1), is 11a timely motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict following a 
timely motion for a directed verdict." There was no trial or verdict. The third type of motion, (3), is 11a timely 
motion to alter or amend the judgment (except motions under Rule 60 or motions regarding costs and attorney 
fees)." Because no judgment was entered at the time Appellant filed the motion for reconsideration, Appellant's 
motion cannot be of the type described in (3). The fourth type of motion, (4), is 11a timely motion for new trial." 
Since there was no trial, appellant's motion for reconsideration cannot be of the type described in (4). 
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holds that a motion for reconsideration which is never noticed for hearing 
or otherwise hec>rd and decided tolls the time for filing an appeal. Not one of 
these cases suggests that Appellant's motion for reconsideration is the type 
of motion I.R.C.P. 83(e){2) describes such that it will suspend running of the 
time for filing the notice of appeal. In fact in Wolfe, the Supreme Court said 
that when a district court fails to rule on a motion, the Supreme Court 
presumes the district court denied the motion. Id. at 503-04. 
Based on Wolfe, Id. the magistrate denied Appellant's motion for 
reconsideration when he entered the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and judgment. 
D. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
In Appellant's arguments about the form of judgment, Appellant (1) 
cited a version of I.R.C.P. that was not in effect at the time of judgment, and 
(2) failed to cite the Supreme Court Order of February 12, 2015, that 
disposed of his other argument concerning the judgment. This, in addition 
to raising the arguments the first time on appeal, is frivolous conduct. 
Appellant's arguments concerning the motion for consideration making 
the notice of appeal timely are based on totally ignoring a litigant's duty to 
notice a motion for hearing, I.R.C.P. 7. Appellant's argument that because 
that motion was never formally decided, the time for appeal was indefinitely 
tolled is based on interpretations of the civil rules that are absurd. This is 
frivolous conduct. 
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For the reasons set forth above Respondent argues that Appellant's 
appeal of the District Court's Order Dismissing Appeal is neither novel nor 
persuasive. Respondent SL!bmits that Appellant's arguments against 
dismissal are wholly without basis in fact or law and are frivolous. 
Respondent requests an award of attorney's fees on this appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code §12-121, §12-123, I.R.C.P. 11, I.A.R. 11.2 and Idaho Code §15-
8-208. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's notice of appeal filed 49 days after the entry of judgment 
was not timely. The motion for reconsideration filed in this case had no 
effect on the time for filing the notice of appeal. Appellant's arguments 
against dismissal are wholly without basis in fact or law and are frivolous. 
This Court ought to affirm the District Court's decision dismissing this appeal 
from Magistrate's Court. 
- v Dated this.;LS-day of September, 2015. 
I , 
Nancyµ: Callahan 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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